A comprehensive Software Copy Protection and Digital Rights Management platform  by Bahaa-Eldin, Ayman Mohammad & Sobh, Mohamed A.A.
Ain Shams Engineering Journal (2014) 5, 703–720Ain Shams University
Ain Shams Engineering Journal
www.elsevier.com/locate/asej
www.sciencedirect.comELECTRICAL ENGINEERINGA comprehensive Software Copy Protection
and Digital Rights Management platform* Corresponding author. Tel.: +20 (11) 11 555750.
E-mail address: ayman.bahaa@eng.asu.edu.eg (A.M. Bahaa-Eldin).
Peer review under responsibility of Ain Shams University.
Production and hosting by Elsevier
2090-4479  2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Ain Shams University.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.asej.2014.03.001Ayman Mohammad Bahaa-Eldin *, Mohamed A.A. SobhComputer and Systems Engineering Department, Ain Shams University, Cairo, EgyptReceived 18 January 2014; revised 2 March 2014; accepted 17 March 2014
Available online 14 April 2014KEYWORDS
Software Copy Protection;
Hacking and cracking;
Digital Rights Management;
Software license and grants;
XrMLAbstract This article proposes a Powerful and Flexible System for Software Copy Protection
(SCP) and Digital Rights Management (DRM) based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) stan-
dards. Software protection is achieved through a multi-phase methodology with both static and
dynamic processing of the executable ﬁle. The system defeats most of the attacks and cracking tech-
niques and makes sure that the protected software is never in a ﬂat form, with a suitable portion of
it always being encrypted during execution. A novel performance-tuning algorithm is proposed to
lower the overhead of the protection process to its minimum depending on the software dynamic
execution behavior. All system calls to access resources and objects such as ﬁles, and input/output
devices are intercepted and encapsulated with secure rights management code to enforce the
required license model. The system can be integrated with hardware authentication techniques (like
dongles), and to Internet based activation and DRM servers over the cloud. The system is ﬂexible to
apply any model of licensing including state-based license such as expiration dates and number of
trials. The usage of a standard markup language (XrML) to describe the license makes it easier to
apply new licensing operations like re-sale and content rental.
 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Ain Shams University.1. Introduction
Software industry is highly affected by piracy. Illegal copying,
tampering, and other non-legitimate distribution of digital
products are increasingly widespread. This reduces the proﬁts
of software industry, hinders the software ecosystem, andcauses huge losses [1]. Software Copy Protection (SCP) and
Digital Rights Management (DRM) are both needed to pro-
tect the software and the digital contents distributed along
with the software or in a stand-alone fashion.
The term Digital Rights management (DRM) broadly re-
fers to a set of policies, techniques and tools that guide the
proper use of digital content [2]. Fig. 1 shows a high-level view
of the ﬂow of protected digital content from its producer to the
consumer. The entities deﬁned in that ﬁgure are [2]:
 The content creator is mainly concerned with the core data/
information that goes into the content. This could be
viewed as raw content, which needs to be processed further
with respect to adhering to certain formats, the suitable
Figure 1 Overview of protected contents/software ﬂow of control.
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ment, additions of possible special effects, and derivation
and addition of metadata (information about the data).
 The producer of the content performs the necessary pro-
cessing and generates the packaged content. The packaged
content is in a form that is suitable for consumption and
for the tracking and management of content usage.
 The consumer is the ultimate user of the content.
The SCP is used to prevent reverse engineering and crack-
ing techniques and to enforce the provided license rights of
the user. DRM is employed to indicate what the end user is
illegible to do with these contents. New DRMs even deals with
rights like re-selling of the contents and re-use them within a
new-produced contents [3]. If the protected contents are pro-
vided alone, they require special software players or viewers
that are able to deal with DRM information. Usually those
players are provided by the operating system providers like
Microsoft and Apple. If the protected contents are provided
within protected software, the embedded protection layer in-
side the executable ﬁles is responsible on processing the
DRM information and controls the protected software
behavior.
The executable ﬁle protection may involve some develop-
ment (Software Development Kit (SDK) Protection Mode).
Alternatively, it can be performed automatically (Shell Protec-
tion Mode). SDK protection requires integration of protection
libraries inside the program code. The ﬁnal program should be
designed to be dependent on the protection libraries. Shell pro-
tection is applied to the software executable (object) ﬁle after
compilation. It does not require the developer interaction. It
intercepts the system calls, encrypts the code section and in-
jects the protection layer. Sometimes it is required to apply
both techniques for better or customized security.
The digital contents protection requires data encryption
using stream or block oriented techniques. The encryption
keys are stored in a secure hardware or software store. The
protection layer is responsible for the decryption after success-
ful authentication of the originality of the software and/or user
rights.
The protection license may vary from trivial to sophisti-
cated license. Trivial license is used to provide run/no-run sit-
uation after making the authentication. Sophisticated license
may divide the software to modules and control each module
separately. It also allows the vendors to deﬁne an expirationcondition, control the authenticate periodicity, and use multi-
ple authentication techniques. Some protection solutions use
custom data structure to describe the license, other uses stan-
dard, readable language like XML or XrML.
Software authentication is performed to determine whether
the client is the license owner or not. Authentication process
involves hardware checking and security key extraction. Some
authentication techniques extract the Machine-ID to identify
the client; other techniques uses special type of CD/DVD
disks, other techniques uses special security tokens like Don-
gles, Smart Tokens and Smart Cards. The security key extrac-
tion may use symmetric or asymmetric (PKI) techniques to
unwrap the keys or simply read the keys from hidden or secrete
hardware store.
2. Previous work on software protection and licensing
2.1. Overview
Software piracy is considered a major problem threatening the
Software industry [4]. In 2007, Business Software Alliance [5]
published a result stating that the weighted average of software
piracy rate (by country) is around 60% of the total software
industry [6]. The rise of software piracy led to the extensive
work in the research and development of different Software
Copy Protection techniques. The Software Copy Protection
is established by different layers. The layers are Code Protec-
tion layer and Licensing and DRM layer.
Code protection helps in protecting Intellectual property of
software vendors by providing methods against reverse engi-
neering and cracking. Code obfuscation for interpreted lan-
guages like Java and C# is one of the popular methods for
establishing the protection. Code obfuscation uses Random
Number Generator [7] to change the original code to unread-
able one. Later on, another technique [8] proposes stronger
obfuscation using cryptography. For the compiled languages,
which produce standard executable ﬁles, the protection is ap-
plied by dynamic injection and code redirection, hashing func-
tions [9] or by remote code distribution [10]. Code protection
requires an enforcement security layer to stop debuggers and
to prevent the reverse engineering or memory spying [11,12].
Code protection strength up the executable ﬁles against crack-
ing, however it is not enough to prevent the software distribu-
tion. SCP should be combined with certain hardware to avoid
environment duplication (ex: CD, Dongles, Machine) [13–16].
Figure 2 PE ﬁle format.
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verse engineering on the executable ﬁle. This ensures that the
crackers will not be able to delete the software protection layer
and recover the original software code. SCP should keep all
protection code and original software code safe.
Traditional protection uses a packing type procedure,
which alters the ﬁle structures, encrypt and compress the ﬁle
sections and inject an executable section to perform the
unpacking. During run-time, the injected section unpacks the
ﬁle into the memory, correct the structure and ﬁnally jump
to the original entry point in order to start the normal execu-
tion. There are many publicly available packers like ‘‘Ultimate
Packer for Executables (UPX)’’ [17], ‘‘PE Compact’’ [18], Ad-
vanced EXE/DLL compressor for Windows [19], and aPLib
v1.01 – compression library [20], which are useful to protect
the code and data in the ﬁle, though their security on disk
and memory can be compromised [21–23]. An overview of
existing techniques and their weaknesses is given below to indi-
cate the need of a new methodology.
Code Obfuscation [24] is considered a common method for
software protection. In [25] Diego et al. present a model for
software protection using code Obfuscation and Fingerprint-
ing combined with license enforcement. The presented model
provides a semi-automated process for protection that involves
the direct interaction of the software developer to modify his
written code in order to make use of the protection process,
unlike the fully automated model proposed by this paper. An-
other code obfuscation method was presented in [26] by mod-
ifying a simple compiler (tcc) to modify certain unconditional
branching instructions to conditional branching aiming at mis-
leading automated reverse engineering tools [23] to detect the
original code.
Another powerful technique for protecting software is self-
modifying code, which means that the code is modifying itself
during run-time, meanwhile keeping it hard to reverse stati-
cally [27]. Another useful property for self-modifying code pre-
sented in [28] is to add an additional self-check using a
checksum maintaining the software integrity. White-Box cryp-
tography is another method for adding security to software;
however, it suffers from static or dynamic key recovery attacks
[24]. The main weakness of the above methods is the ability of
a cracker to do a ‘‘memory left’’ which is copying the program
memory after all checking, de-obfuscation and decryption oc-
curs. This will give the cracker a clean working plain version of
the software where all protection techniques and checks can be
removed.
Software watermarking is also another recent technique to
protect the software on local computer and in the cloud. In this
technique, a watermark is embedded within the software and is
extracted for authentication. Recent work on this technique
can be found in [29,30].
Therefore, a new combined method to protect the pro-
gram that will never provide a complete plain non-obfus-
cated version of it in the memory has to be implemented.
An initial proposal for this method was previously
published in [31]. The novel proposed method contains
several phases during a software life cycle and combines
static and dynamic techniques to perform the required
mission. The method is applied on windows based executa-
bles, which are presented in a Portable Executable (PE) for-
mat, and binary libraries (DLLs), but can be extended to
any other binary format.2.2. Portable executable ﬁle format
Software executable ﬁles have different formats that vary from
a system to another depending on the writing language, com-
piler, target machine and operating system. Portable Execut-
able format [32] is used to represent executable ﬁles in all
Windows platforms. The PE ﬁle contains, ﬁle headers, sections
and structures. Understanding the ﬁle format is important to
understand the loading process performed by the operating
system and the linking mechanism to exiting libraries.
A PE ﬁle is composed of a group of headers followed by a
set of sections holding code, data and other useful informa-
tion. The headers include DOS Header, NT Headers and Sec-
tions Headers [32,33]. Each section header holds information
like the size, the starting position, and the characteristics of
the section. For example the ‘‘.text’’ section (code section)
header provides the Relative Virtual Address (RVA) value
which is used to determine the starting position of the section
in memory, this value is important if the executable ﬁle is
loaded in a location other than the preferred location (Re-
Location) [32,33]. Another example is the NT Headers, which
provide general information like the PE signature, target ma-
chine type, the ﬁle characteristic, the Image Base, the Image
Size and the Entry Point. The Image Base value determines
the preferred starting address of the image when loading into
memory. The Entry Point determines the address of the ﬁrst
instruction. Fig. 2 is a block diagram of a typical PE ﬁle.
2.3. License management
The licensing layer of the Software Copy Protection system is
essential to control the software distribution, while the code
protection secures the code. Licensing system extends the copy
protection to another level in controlling the distribution of the
software with different schemes [34]. Digital Rights Manage-
ment is typically included within the license, which describes
the different rights available for the users on the software
[3,35–37].
In [3], a new DRM system using machine activation tech-
nique is proposed. The new system supports extendable li-
censes management features such as selling, renting, demo,
reselling, transfer and revocation. Machine activation is not
recommended for license reselling, transfer and revocation.
There is no way to prevent clients from using system recovery
software to restore their machines to a previous working state.
It is recommended to use machine activation with periodical
online authentication. This will update the license with the lat-
est status.
In [36], a theoretical model for the trusted computing
environment required to implement the DRM system and to
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ence of a secure storage and processing hardware (Smart To-
ken) is assumed. Actually, there is no way to guarantee the
security in case of remote clients. There is no way to prevent
clients from using virtual or vulnerable tokens. Another issue
is that, token solution is expensive and suitable only to protect
enterprise software applications. Therefore, this model [36] is
not suitable to distribute software applications. Normally soft-
ware vendors prefer to have full control to software protection
and token preparation.
In [37], the issue of using intangible tokens instead of real
tokens is discussed. Intangible tokens are Software Tokens
that work in a very similar way to Machine Activation tech-
nique. Lower security solutions participate effectively on ﬁght-
ing the piracy is concluded.
In [35], a new technique for key management is proposed.
The technique discusses protection key exchange in DRM sys-
tems using multiple authentication devices. The technique as-
sumes that each machine has its own certiﬁcate, which is
used to encrypt the protection keys. The technique does not
discuss the private key security of each device. It is possible
to exchange the private keys and allow unlicensed users to ac-
cess the contents. In addition, the paper does not provide a li-
cense enforcement solution.
In general, SCP and DRM had been implemented so far in
a separate fashion. It is required to have an integrated plat-
form that combines both. Even the combined solutions does
not provide alternative hardware authentication. In addition,
most of the published systems does not handle the attacks to
software executable ﬁles and concentrate only on the hardware
security.
DRM system should allow alternative identiﬁcation tech-
niques even with lower security. Community software vendors
require cost effective solutions with ﬂexible distribution sup-
port. Machine activation is considered as cost effective solu-
tion with moderate security. CD and DVD protection is very
suitable for multimedia and gaming sectors. This paper pro-
poses another model for remote user using machine activation.
Machine activation is cheaper and provides similar security to
remote token. There is no way to make sure that remote client
does not manipulate the identity without forcing a speciﬁc
hardware. In this paper, we will use XrML [38] license stan-
dard, introduced by Content-Guard [39] and used in different
systems [40].
A comprehensive approach that outperforms the previously
proposed or implemented commercial systems is described in
the next sections. First, the Software Copy Protection is de-
scribed. Then, the XrML license structure and DRM approach
are introduced. Finally, the integration of both techniques and
evaluation of the platform is given.3. Dynamic infection and code redirection based technique for
portable executable ﬁle protection
As discussed earlier, it is required to develop a trusted power-
ful and high performance Software Copy Protection integrated
with license management. In this section, the novel proposed
copy protection approach is detailed. The protection system
is divided into 2 phases:1. Static Protection, where the PE ﬁle is treated to produce a
protected encrypted object ﬁle with an extra security
section.
2. Dynamic Protection, where the secured object ﬁle is loaded
into memory and processed for execution. This phase is
critical to maintain both the security of the software against
cracking, debugging and memory lifting, and to adjust the
performance of the protected software. During the dynamic
protection phase, Digital Rights Management is applied
using the license ﬁle as detailed in the next section.
Fig. 3 represents a block diagram of the 2 phase of
protection.
3.1. Static protection of PEs
The ﬁrst phase of a program protection is performed in the
Post-Build phase. This is to modify the PE ﬁle structures,
changes its characteristic, alters contents, and injects new sec-
tions. These steps prepare the PE for further protection. They
are described as follows:
3.1.1. Modifying PE structure
In this step, the values in the PE File headers that describe the
properties and characteristics of the ﬁle are modiﬁed. The
changed values are the Number of Sections, Address of Entry
Point, Size of Image and Data Directories RVAs and Sizes
(Import, Relocation, COM etc.).
The modiﬁcation process involves adding a new section
(Security Section) to the PE ﬁle. This section is supplied with
the necessary information used to perform the unpacking
(reversing the modiﬁcations). The supplied information in-
cludes the original PE File headers and structures, which are
removed or altered while applying the protection. Fig. 4 illus-
trates the overall structure of the PE ﬁle after the modiﬁca-
tions, with the added Security Section.
3.1.2. Modifying import table structure
Imported Address Table provides the imported DLLs and the
imported Functions. Imported Functions are called by the PE
at run time. The protection works by modifying the Imported
Address Table, where the new table will depend on a special
DLL developed as part of the protection system called the Pro-
tection DLL. The Protection DLL works with the Security
Section to perform the unpacking operation. That means all
calls to DLLs including System DLLs are intercepted and han-
dled by the protection code before being passed to the original
target.
3.1.3. Static Code Redirection
The Static Code Redirection process adds extra security and
protection to the PE ﬁle. This operation is similar to the meth-
od used in [26], aiming to redirect certain JMP/CALL instruc-
tions in the PE Original Code toward an Interception Jump
Table (IJT) that depends on the Protection DLL. Fig. 5 illus-
trates the IJT structure, while Fig. 6 illustrates the instructions
used for the redirection operation in each IJT entry.
The Static Code Redirection process works by disassem-
bling the PE code, then selecting certain Far JMP or CALL
Figure 3 Protection static and dynamic phases.
Figure 4 PE ﬁle after applying the modiﬁcations.
Figure 5 Contents and structure of the Interception Jump
Table (IJT).
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sponding IJT Entry. The Protection DLL is responsible for
correcting the IJT-Entry-Code-Stub during run-time in order
to redirect the execution ﬂow toward the correct location. This
process called the Dynamic Code Redirection, which is un-
iquely deﬁned by this technique.
3.1.4. PE ﬁle encryption
The protection process encrypts certain parts of the PE ﬁle in or-
der to protect it against disassembling and reverse engineering.
The encryption is applied whether the ﬁle on disk or in themem-
ory during the execution. The protection process encrypts the
code, data sections, original import table and IJT. The protec-
tion process hides the key somewhere in the PE ﬁle, or it can
use a Derived Key from some parts of the PE ﬁle using any
key derivation algorithms [41,42]. White-Box Cryptography[24] is considered a solution to this problem, which proposes a
software only solution for protection against key recovery. We
propose using a double encryption process; by combining the
derived key with a hardware-based key (stored or derived from
a hardware device, like Hardware Tokens, Machine Identiﬁer,
or Special Optical Disk Signature). Combining several process
of protection on the PE ﬁle makes it harder for automated re-
verse engineering and disassembler tools to succeed in reversing
the protected code. The code section encryption provides false
program ﬂow in case of direct disassembling. The encryption
Figure 6 Code Stub in each IJT entry, where the last JMP
Instruction redirects the code toward the original instruction.
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static reverse engineering to the harder dynamic one.Moreover,
linking the protection process to the Protection DLL increases
the effort of the dynamic reverse engineering.
3.2. Dynamic Unpacking Operation
The Dynamic Unpacking Operation is responsible for
unpacking the protected PE ﬁle in memory using the Protec-
tion DLL. When the protected application is loaded in
memory, the Windows Loader automatically loads the Pro-
tection DLL, because it resides in the modiﬁed Import Ad-
dress Table. The purpose of loading the Protection DLL
while loading the protected application is to reverse the
static protection modiﬁcations before the application starts
the execution. The following steps explain the reversing
(unpacking) operations:
1. Go through the debugger detection procedure like the one
in [12], and stop the unpacking operation if debugging
behaviors are detected. This extra protection step prevents
a cracker from using a dynamic debugger or disassembler
to remove the protection.
2. Extract the PE special information from the Injected Secu-
rity Section.
3. Decrypt the ﬁrst part Code Section, Data Section, Original
Import table and the IJT Stub located in the Security Sec-
tion using a Derived (Combined) Encryption Key. In the
subsequent execution steps, other part of the Code section
is decrypted while the ﬁrst part is encrypted again. This is to
prevent the existence of a complete plain code in memory to
prevent the Memory Left attacks.
4. Perform Base Relocation Process [32]; if the Load Address
of the PE ﬁle in memory was in a different location than the
preferred address (Image Base).
5. Load all Imported DLLs found in the original Import
Address Table located in the inject Security Section, then
retrieve the real memory addresses of all their Imported
Functions, and then update the Imported Address
Table (IAT) [32,33]. This step is associated with an opera-
tion called Dynamic PE Infection, mentioned later.
6. Extract all IJT header information and descriptors and
retrieve the correct jump address for every IJT entry.
7. If necessary corrects or corrupts the PE ﬁle Headers in
memory [12].The following pseudo-code illustrates the operations.
//Dynamic Unpacking Operation
// Inputs: The loaded Protected Software
// Operation: Unpack the protected software and
prepare it for execution
begin
if DetectDebuger() is true
begin
stop unpacking
exit program
end
Parse Security Section to extract PE Special
Information
DecryptionKey= Derived (Combined) Key
Decrypt First Part of Each PE Section
if PE Load Address is different from preferred
address
begin
Perform Base Relocation
End
for each imported DLL found in the Imported
Address Table (IAT) do
begin
Load DLL into memory
Retrieve memory location of all the DLL imported
functions
Update the IAT of the PE with the real address
End
for each entry in the Import Jump Table do
begin
retrieve the correct jump address
end
Correct/ Corrupt the PE File headers in Memory
endThe Protection DLL performs the above operations while
loading, though in some cases (like protected DLLs) the
Unpacking DLL performs these operations by receiving a call
from the Unpacking Code Stub that exists in the Security Sec-
tion in the PE ﬁle. The static operation changes the original
Entry Point to reference the Unpacking Code Stub instead
of the original Entry Point. The Unpacking Code Stub calls
an Exported API from the Protection DLL, which performs
the mentioned unpacking operations, and then the Code Stub
ends by a JMP instruction to the original entry point. Trans-
forming the Code Stub to Self-Modifying Code [27] can add
extra strength to this code stub. One drawback for Self-Mod-
ifying Code is that it is used by many computer viruses, which
might raise the threat of detecting the Protected Application as
a virus by commercial Anti-Virus programs.
3.3. Dynamic PE infection
The purpose of the Dynamic PE Infection is to handle the con-
trol to the Protection DLL over all loaded modules in the pro-
tected Application memory space, and mainly keeps the
Protected Application attached to the Protection DLL
throughout the execution time. The operation works by API
Interception, which is to intercept some selected system APIs
and perform some operations additional to the regular opera-
tion of that API.
Figure 8 The redirection operation for correcting the execution
ﬂow during run-time.
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ing the value of the target API Address in the infected mod-
ule’s IAT (Imported Address Table) in memory. By changing
this address, any CALL instruction – depending on the IAT
values – will instead call another Function (with the same
interface and parameters of the Original API) exported by
the Protection DLL. These exported Interception APIs will
perform extra functionalities over the main functionality of
the Original Intercepted API. Fig. 7 illustrates the Intercep-
tion process resulting from infecting a certain module in
memory.
In Fig. 7, The Protection DLL modiﬁes the IAT of the
protected PE ﬁle in memory by replacing the IAT entry
corresponding to a speciﬁc API (ex: API_1 Address) by
the Address in the Protection DLL. When the Original
PE code starts execution, it will make a call to API_1,
as illustrated by the CALL instruction. The CALL instruc-
tion makes the API call by referencing the API address in
the IAT. The Operating System Loader is responsible for
updating the IAT with the real addresses of all the APIs
imported by the PE ﬁle. By replacing this address, the
CALL instruction will execute the Interception API_1 in
Protection DLL instead of the real API. The Interception
API is responsible for calling the Real API in its System
DLL in order to make the calling process transparent to
the protected PE. The original system call is now encapsu-
lated by a previous and after codes. If these system calls
are ﬁle reads or writes, then those reads or writes are val-
idated against the user rights present in the license ﬁle.
Protected encrypted digital media can be processed here
and decrypted for proper rendering in the executable ﬁle.
Other operations as network sends and receives IO device
accesses like printing and screen captures are all handled
the same way providing maximum security. This Dynamic
Infection operation is recursive over all loaded modules
in the application’s memory space.Figure 7 API Interception process by the modiﬁcation of the
IAT.3.4. Dynamic Code Redirection
As mentioned earlier in the Static Code Redirection, the
redirection operation is responsible for redirecting the code
execution to its correct sequence. Fig. 8 illustrates the Redi-
rection Operation. The Code Redirection increases the secu-
rity and protection of the PE ﬁle against Reverse
Engineering, Cracking and Memory Dumping [12]. The pro-
cess mainly keeps the PE ﬁle always attached to the Protec-
tion DLL in order to perform the execution correctly, as
any attempt to unload the Protection DLL or trying to re-
move it from the Import Table of the PE ﬁle will lead to
false execution of the original code. Although this operation
adds more security to the PE ﬁle, it still adds an overhead
on the execution process, especially in the case of CPU
intensive applications as in the case of Graphics Applica-
tions. The overhead is high, as the operation adds extra
instructions, IJT, Code Stub, and redirection operation for
every modiﬁed JMP/CALL instruction. In order to solve
this overhead problem, the Dynamic Code Redirection pro-
vides an algorithm that decreases the overhead on the exe-
cution and in the same time does not affect the security of
the PE ﬁle while maintaining security. The algorithm treats
each IJT Entry as a stand-alone entity and monitors the
number of executions of each entity (Number of Hits). At
the same time, it monitors the Global number of executions
(Global Number of Hits) of all the entities in the execution
time. Those two counters are the keys to balance the speed,
the performance and the security of the protected
application.
Each entity holds the Entity State, whether it is Encrypted,
Decrypted or Corrected, besides it holds the Number of Hits,
providing how much this entity has been executed. The follow-
ing is the explanation of each state:
 Encrypted: The destinationRVA in the last JMP instruc-
tion in the IJT Entry -in Fig. 6- is encrypted and requires
decryption by Redirect function in order to perform
execution correctly. At the end of the static protection
operations, all entities have an Encrypted state.
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tion in the IJT Entry is decrypted, though it requires an
adjustment through the IJT and it may affect the
RedirectionAlgorithmdepending on the number of hits.
 Corrected: The destination RVA is corrected and requires
no adjustment so this entity can be directly executed.
The algorithm modiﬁes each IJT Entry according to its En-
tity State, Entity Number of Hits, and Global Number of Hits
for all entities, Number of Corrected/Decrypted Entities per
module and four predeﬁned thresholds. The counters and
thresholds are:
 Entity Hit Count (EHC): The number of executions
(calls or jumps) to this entity. This counter is set to zero
at the beginning of execution for all entities.
 Global Hit Count (GHC): The total number of hits to
all entities. This counter is set to zero at the beginning
of execution and when encryption is needed.
 Corrected Entities Count (CEC): The total number of
corrected entities in memory. This counter starts with
zero.
 Decrypted Entities Count (DEC): The total number of
decrypted entities. This counter starts with zero.
 Entity Hit Threshold (EHT): A threshold, which
implies that the state of the entity should change to cor-
rected if its Number of Hits exceeds that threshold. The
algorithm should compare this threshold to the Num-
ber of Hits of the executed entity.
 Global Hit Threshold (GHT): A threshold, which
implies that the state of a decrypted IJT Entry with
the minimum Number of Hits should change to
encrypted. The algorithm should compare this thresh-
old to the Global Number of Hits. This threshold is
used to perform a periodical maintenance to the pro-
tected software to keep a reasonable part of the pro-
gram in a scrambled form for the sake of security
and to move out old parts of the program that had
not been used recently.
 Correction Threshold (CT): A threshold, which implies
that the total number of corrected instructions in mem-
ory is high and the algorithm should encrypt the entry
with the Minimum Number of Hits. This threshold can
be a percentage of the total number of entries (e.g.
25%).
 Decryption Threshold (DT): A threshold which implies
that the total number of decrypted entries is high and
the algorithm should encrypt the entry with the Mini-
mum Number of Hits. This threshold can be a percent-
age of the total number of entries (e.g. 50%).
The Entity Hit Threshold mainly aims to speed up the
execution of the original code by correcting its destination
address, so that this instruction will not jump to the IJT
Entry anymore, assuming that exceeding this threshold
indicates the continuous execution of that speciﬁc instruc-
tion. Meanwhile, the Global Hit Threshold, Correction
Threshold and Decryption Threshold aim to maintain
the security by encrypting a decrypted/corrected Entry.
The following pseudo-code illustrates the algorithm. Theperformance-tuning algorithm is executed at each call to
a subroutine in the program that requires an access to
IJT.
//Performance Tuning Algorithm
//Called each time an Entity of the protected
software is executed (Jump / Call)
begin
Entity = thisEntity
Increment (EHC(Entity))
Increment (GHC)
if State(Entity) = Encrypted
begin
Decrypt(Entity)
Set State(Entity) to Decrypted
Increment (DEC)
End
if State(Entity) = Decrypted
begin
Extract RVA(Entity) from IJT
Calculate Entry Address (Entity) from RVA
if EHC>EHT
begin
Correct RVA(Entity) in IJT
Set State(Entity) to Corrected
Increment (CEC)
end
end
if State(Entity) = Corrected
begin
Entry Address (Entity) = RVA(Entity)
End
Jump to Entity Address (Entity) // Execute the
code
EncryptionRequired = false
if GHC>GHT
begin
Set GHC to 0
EncryptionRequired = true
End
if DEC>DT
begin
EncryptionRequired = true
End
if CEC>CT
begin
Decrement (CEC)
EncryptionRequired = true
End
if EncryptionRequired = true
begin
Decrement (DEC)
Entity= Find Entity with minimum EHC
Encrypt (Entity)
Set EHC(Entity) to 0
Set State(Entity) to Encrypted
End
endFig. 9 illustrates the state diagram of an IJT Entry.
Figure 9 State diagram of an IJT Entry.
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It is important to assess the protected applications perfor-
mance compared to their performance before applying the pro-
tection. It is also needed to assess the Redirection algorithm
and its effect on the performance and security of the protected
application.
The ﬁrst performance test is to assess the executable loading
duration overhead. Since the protected application is statically
linked to the Protection DLL, the Protection DLL loading will
add certain overhead over the loading time of the executable.
This overhead will add time delay to the original loading time
of all DLLs in the Import Table, due to performing the
Unpacking, PE Infection and Redirection operations by the
Protection DLL. This delay is deﬁned as Unpack Delay Dura-
tion. The test works by protecting an Executable ﬁle and mea-
suring the duration of the Load Operations done by the
Protection DLL. These measures are obtained for different
number of modules in one application. For example, if Execut-
able A depends on DLLs B and C, then the measures are ob-
tained for protected software A only, then for A and B,
afterward for A, B, and C and so forth.
Fig. 10 shows a graph for the Average Unpack Delay Dura-
tion per Protected Modules. The test is applied to different
applications and number of their dependencies. It must be sta-
ted that there cannot be a ﬁxed Unpack Delay Duration for all
applications and modules, as the complexity and number of
dependencies of the modules differ from one to another.Figure 10 Average unpack delay overhead per protected
module.Therefore, the graph result can differ depending on the tar-
get-protected applications. The test results show that an Aver-
age Unpack Delay overhead reach 30% of unprotected
loading time for a set of four protected modules.
The second performance test is to assess the Redirection
algorithm. A custom application written in ·86 assembly was
used in order to provide a more speciﬁc test-bench for testing
the effect of the algorithm. The custom application contains
massive loops with 24 function calls (CALL instructions)
which shall be modiﬁed by the Static Code Redirection pro-
cess. The custom application takes 9500 ms for the whole exe-
cution time before applying protection on the test machine.
By adjusting the thresholds with different values, the per-
formance test is to check the total execution time of the appli-
cation, while the security test is to check the state of all IJT
entries after ﬁnishing execution. A software cracker using Dy-
namic Reverse Engineering can simply wait until the applica-
tion ﬁnishes execution and right then dumps the application
from memory to the disk (Memory Left). The Code redirection
security should make this operation useless, as the dumped
Code section would give false execution. Table 1 presents the
ﬁnal test results for the protected application with different
threshold values.
The results show that changing the Thresholds values af-
fects the performance and security of the protected applica-
tion. The ﬁrst entry in Table 1 shows a result of adjusting
threshold to maximize the security, which by the end of the
execution kept 30 IJT Entries encrypted, but the performance
was weak as execution duration increased by 177% over the
original time. The second table entry shows a result of adjust-
ing the thresholds to decrease the security slightly for the sake
of performance, which led to a result of 31 Decrypted IJT En-
tries with enhanced performance of about one extra second
over the original time. Though the performance result is con-
sidered acceptable, the application security is at stake, as all
the IJT Entries are decrypted without any encrypted entries.
The third entry shows a result for adjusting thresholds values
in order to increase the security without affecting the perfor-
mance severely, which in turn increased the number of en-
crypted IJT Entries to four. The ﬁfth table entry is the actual
test for the Redirection Algorithm. The entry shows a result
of adjusting all the thresholds to maintain security and en-
hance the performance. The performance was enhanced by
Table 1 The effect of changing the threshold values on the state of each entry and the total execution time of the whole program.
Threshold variables value Decrypted entries Corrected entries Encrypted entries Percentage increase of
execution Time (%)
1 DT=MAXa, CT =MAX 1 0 30 177
EHT=MAX, GHT= 1
2 DT=MAX, CT =MAX 31 0 0 13
EHT=MAX, GHT=MAX
3 DT= 0.9, CT =MAX 27 0 4 16
EHT=MAX, GHT=MAX
4 DT= 0.5, CT =MAX 15 0 16 104
EHT=MAX, GHT=MAX
5 DT= 0.9, CT = 0.8 3 20 8 6.5
EHT= 50, GHT= 10
6 DT= 0.5, CT = 0.25 12 6 13 126
EHT= 50, GHT= 10
a MAX: maximum value, means this threshold cannot be reached and has no effect.
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affected the Entries states to be corrected. Meanwhile, adjust-
ing the Decryption and Correction thresholds to 0.9 and 0.8
respectively maintained the security by keeping eight IJT En-
tries Encrypted and three IJT Entries Decrypted. This adjust-
ment enhanced the performance by adding 600 ms – 6.5%
increase – over the original time, which gave the fastest perfor-
mance. This performance is better than the second entry
thresholds and maintains more security.
The Redirection Algorithm proposes two problems that can
be a target of a future work. The ﬁrst problem is how to en-
hance the selection of the JMP/CALL instructions to be redi-
rected throughout the Static Code Redirection aiming at
providing the highest security with the optimal performance.
The second problem is to ﬁnd a Mathematical model for the
Dynamic Code Redirection operation that can predicts the
behavior of the protected application regarding both Applica-
tion’s Security and Performance.Figure 11 Signed XrML license structure.4. XrML license structure
XrML is a standard to describe license structure based on
XML. This section describes what is the license structure
used in the proposed copy protection system. The license
will mainly describe the Rights and Conditions that
should be applied to the software, while maintaining li-
cense integrity and entity authentication. The proposed li-
cense is combined with the protected software and a
hardware authentication media to provide highest possible
security.
4.1. License ﬁelds
Fig. 11 illustrates the different ﬁelds in the license structure,
while Table 2 gives a brief description for the main XrML li-
cense ﬁelds:
Those ﬁelds are structured in an XML ﬁle, which provides
readability for the users. Readability gives the users a chance
to read their own rights on the software as described in
Table 2.4.2. License security
The proposed license readability feature raises a security risk
of modifying the license contents and compromising the whole
license security. Using Public Key cryptography and Digital
Signature [43] will provide the required strength for the license
security. The following points describe the license security:
Table 2 The main XrML license ﬁelds and their description.
License ﬁeld Description
1 H/W public key Public part of the Private key that should be stored on the hardware device
2 S/W public certiﬁcate This certiﬁcate identiﬁes the Software
3 Grant This represents the modules/features in the software which is controlled by DRM and conditions
4 Rights Diﬀerent rights on the Grant. Rights are Execute, Read, Write, Copy, Print and Edit. Those rights
can be extended
5 Conditions Diﬀerent conditions controlling the software operation. Conditions are Duration Limit,Max. No. of
Sessions, Max. No. of Users, Max No. of Trials and Expiration Date
6 License sequence Unique sequence number for the license. This is useful for license update
7 Protection key The Encryption key used in encrypting the software and data accompanying the license
8 Issuer signature The vendor signature value for the license contents
9 S/W vendor certiﬁcate Public Certiﬁcate identifying the Software vendor
10 S/W private certiﬁcate Private part of the software certiﬁcate
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authenticate the software running the license. The software
should include the certiﬁcate password in order to open and
use the S/W Private certiﬁcate.
 License Integrity: License integrity is achieved using Digital
Signature. The whole license is signed by the Vendor Certif-
icate and veriﬁed in run-time with the Vendor Public Certif-
icate ﬁeld in the license. However, in order to secure the
Vendor Public Certiﬁcate ﬁeld from alteration, it should
be wrapped with the S/W private certiﬁcate.
 Entity Authentication: Each license is linked with a speciﬁc
hardware device/media. The hardware device represents
the identity of the user and should include the Private Hard-
ware certiﬁcate, which matches the H/W Public Key ﬁeld in
the license. This method will keep the license attached to the
user and resists license redistribution.
 Protection Key Security: The protection key is used in all
encryption/decryption process in the software memory.
This ﬁeld is double wrapped with S/W Certiﬁcate and H/
W Certiﬁcate. Double wrapping the key keeps the key as
secured as possible.4.3. License features
The proposed license structure provides a rich set of features to
software protection:
 DRM: The availability of different rights and conditions is
a good infrastructure for describing Digital Rights Manage-
ment whether it was intended for software or data.
 Modules: This license structure can contain multiple modules
(Protected object/Grant) which can be used in controlling
different parts of the software in a clear descriptive form.
 Readability: The XML nature of the license gives the user
an easy readable license, which eliminates any inconve-
nience in the rights and condition delivered to the user.
 Updatable: License update is done easily by increasing the
sequence number tag. Sending a new license ﬁle is sufﬁcient
to change the rights and conditions supplied to speciﬁc users.
5. Integrated Software Copy Protection and Digital Rights
Management
Combining the license management with Software Copy
Protection provides the required strength in a completeSCP/DRM system. Protecting the software using the previ-
ously described technique is the ﬁrst step. Then using a strong
license’s owner authentication technique like USB dongle,
Internet Activation and device ID will ensure maximum
security.
In order to build the dongle maximum secured hardware
protection, PKI Smart Tokens are to be used as dongles. A
Smart Token is a hardware device built for PKI solutions
[44]. Smart Tokens are mainly used for Digital Signature oper-
ations and have strong security standards to keep their content
safe against hardware cracking.
The other protection technique is Internet Activation based
on the device ID. Internet Activation works by forcing a link
between a remote server and the software. Once the software
starts running, it should perform authentication operation
with the server in order to continue running. The authentica-
tion is performed through internet and can be synchronous
or asynchronous.
We will describe next how to combine the copy protection
techniques with license structure.5.1. User identiﬁcation and authentication
User identiﬁcation and authentication is an important part in
the copy protection process. We will describe how the pro-
posed system will identify and authenticate the user according
to each hardware protection technique:5.1.1. Dongle protection
In the case of Dongle protection technique, the user is
identiﬁed by a Private Certiﬁcate stored on the Dongle.
Since the dongle is typically a Smart Token, certiﬁcate stor-
age and management is quite easy. The public part of the
certiﬁcate is the H/W Public Key tag in the license struc-
ture. Authentication can be established by matching the
Public Key in the license with the Private part stored on
the dongle via a challenge-response protocol, where a nonce
is generated and encrypted by the public key and sent (the
challenge) to the token. Then on the token, a decryption
and a special function is applied, re-encrypted by the pri-
vate key and sent back (response) for veriﬁcation. The
strength of using Smart Tokens is that Private Certiﬁcates
cannot be exported, and in this way, it cannot be used
by any other user.
714 A.M. Bahaa-Eldin, M.A.A. Sobh5.1.2. Internet activation protection
Internet Activation user identiﬁcation is established in a differ-
ent way. User identiﬁcation is done based on the machine run-
ning the software, by extracting unique information about the
machine (ex: HDD Serial Number) and registering the ma-
chine on the server. The identiﬁcation process can be summa-
rized in the following steps:
1. Software extracts unique information from the user
machine.
2. Software registers the unique information on the activation
server and fails if duplicated.
3. Activation server generates a User Certiﬁcate speciﬁc to the
user machine and generates a license with a Public Key tag
holding the public part of the user certiﬁcate.
4. Software receives the new License and Private certiﬁcate.
The Private certiﬁcate should be stored in a secure area
on the HDD with password protection derived from the
machine ID.
User Authentication can be established by matching the H/
W Public key tag in the license with the Private certiﬁcate
stored on the HDD, besides establishing a connection to verify
that user machine is registered on the server.
5.2. License grants and validation
License Grants (Protected Objects) are the main components
that need to be validated, as they represent the main Rights
and Conditions applied on the software. License Grants
should be kept in a secure place in order to be validated against
the grants existing in the license. In the case of Dongle protec-
tion, License Grants are stored on the Smart Token protected
ﬂash memory, while in the case of Internet Activation protec-
tion the license grants are stored on the remote server. Validat-
ing the license grants is established according to the Protection
technique tag in license. Stored grants should be compared to
existing license grants and their values should be updated if up-
date is required.5.3. Communication security
Securing data on Smart Token and Activation server is estab-
lished to resist any type of popular attacks. However, one form
of cracking can be established by intercepting the communica-
tion between the software and the hardware Dongle or the
Activation Server. Intercepting the communication link will
give the opportunity for crackers to start constructing emula-
tors, which perform Replay Attacks and circumvent the soft-
ware protection technique. Smart Tokens provide a solution
for this problem, as PKI standards overcome such problem
by encrypting the channel between the software and the hard-
ware device [44]. Regarding Internet Activation protection, we
suggest using SSL connection to establish secure connection.
Another way is to use the software Certiﬁcate to construct a
secure link based on Unique Sessions Key for each software
user. The Session Key is used to encrypt the channel between
the software and the server. Another step to protect the integ-
rity of the messages is that all data should be signed with the
software Private Certiﬁcate. Session Keys and SignedMessages will prevent crackers from constructing emulators
performing replay attacks.
5.4. License grants as Public-Key Cryptography Standards
(PKCS) objects
License grants should be transformed in order to be stored on
the Smart Token or the Activation server. The transformation
is for the sake of validation process. Grant Record is the struc-
ture used in license rights and conditions validation. Each Li-
cense Grant is mapped to a Grant Record, which stores
updatable information represented in a form that can be used
in the validation process. Table 3 illustrates the ﬁelds of the
Grant Record, the ﬁeld description and the ﬁeld size in Bytes.
As shown in Table 3, the total size of each grant record is
216 bytes, which is the space consumed in Smart Token or Ser-
ver database. Grant Records can be stored in any format, but
we suggest using PKCS#11 standard to establish this opera-
tion. Most Smart Tokens conform to PKCS standards, be-
cause this standard is used in many applications and
interfaces. PKCS#11 uses a structure called PKCS Object
[44]. A PKCS Object is a data structure with different attri-
butes that is used to store different data types and information
on Smart Token memory. The advantage of using PKCS Ob-
jects is to create a standard method for Grant Records storage
with ﬁxed interface. Table 4 illustrates the proposed PKCS ob-
ject attributes.
The proposed Grant Record structure can be used in both
Dongle protection and Internet Activation protection, which
provides an easy and single interface while developing the sys-
tem. The Grant Record is not a one-to-one mapping to the li-
cense Grants; these modiﬁcations are implemented in order to
provide a way for the system to validate the license grants
Rights and Conditions and detecting any try to circumvent
the license by modifying the Operating System parameters
(e.g.: System Date).
The following points give detailed description about the
grant record ﬁeld’s functionality, and how is this ﬁeld used
in protecting the system from cracking attempts.
 Running Time: This ﬁeld controls the total running time. Total
running time should not exceed theDuration Limit deﬁned by
the License ﬁle. Initially, this ﬁeld is initialized with the Dura-
tion Limit and then decremented by the running durations
until it reaches zero. The SCP updates this value periodically
without affecting the software performance.
 Number of Users: This ﬁeld controls the maximum number
of simultaneous users. Initially, this ﬁeld is initialized with
the maximum number of users as deﬁned in the license ﬁle.
The ﬁeld value is decremented for each new user and incre-
mented if the user exit. Whenever the ﬁled value reaches
zero the SCP stops any future user until one of the existing
session exits.
 Number of Sessions: This ﬁeld controls the maximum num-
ber of simultaneous sessions. User may start multiple ses-
sions. Initially, this ﬁeld is initialized with the maximum
number of sessions as deﬁned in the license ﬁle. The ﬁeld
value is decremented for each new session and incremented
if the session exit. Whenever the ﬁled value reaches zero the
SCP stops any future session until one of the existing ses-
sion exits.
Table 3 The grant record ﬁelds, description and size in bytes.
Grant record ﬁeld name Description Size (B)
1 Grant ID Unique ID for the grant 16
2 Running time Down Counter holding the time remaining for the running software 8
3 Number of sessions Number of Sessions allowed for the user 8
4 Number of trials Down Counter holding the number of trials of the software 8
5 Trial period Down Counter holding the number of days remaining for the software 8
6 Number of users Number of users allowed to run the software 8
7 Last run-time Local Timestamp for the last run of the software 64
8 First run-time Local Timestamp for the ﬁrst run of the software 64
9 Machine ID Unique Machine ID 32
Table 4 The attributes of the PKCS object and their values.
Attribute name Value
1 CKA_CLASS CKO_DATA
2 CKA_OBJECT_ID Grant ID mentioned in Table 1
3 CKA_TOKEN CK_TRUE
4 CKA_PRIVATE CK_TRUE
5 CKA_VALUE Grant record data mentioned in Table 1
A comprehensive Software Copy Protection and Digital Rights Management platform 715 Number of Trials: This ﬁeld controls the number of trials.
Initially, this ﬁeld is initialized with the maximum number
of trials as deﬁned in the license ﬁle. The ﬁeld value is decre-
mented for every software session or grant access. Once the
ﬁeld value reaches zero, the Grant expires.
 Last Run-time: The last time the Grant has been requested.
This value is important to detect any manipulation of the
system date/time values.
 First Run-time: The ﬁrst time the Grant has been requested.
This value is important to detect the manipulation of the
system date/time values. In addition, it is used to determine
the actual trial period.
 Trial Period: This value is calculated by subtracting the ﬁrst
run time from the current run time. If the value exceeds the
maximum trial period deﬁned in the license ﬁle, the Grant
expires.
Storing the Grant Records on the hardware Smart Token
or on remote Activation Server will keep the records from
being altered by any cracker.
5.5. License enforcement
As described in the Dynamic PE Infection step of software
protection, all system calls are intercepted and encapsulated
with the protection code. In this stage, the encapsulation code
will check if the object being accessed by a system call, i.e. read
or write, is protected and licensed. The read or write operation
differs from an object to another, so for example if the object is
the printer then a read operation has no meaning while a write
operation is a print order.
Recall Fig. 7, all system calls are encapsulated with a code
within the unpacking DLL. This code checks for the grant and
user privileges and based on that, the system call is performed
or denied. The following pseudo-code illustrates the enforce-
ment operation.//API Interception code
//This operation is executed whenever a system call
that accesses a protected object is required
begin
if the target object is protected
begin
User = Identify(Current User)
Validate(License File)
Read(Object Grants) from License File
Read(User Rights) from License File
if operation is forbidden or Grant Expired
begin
deny operation
Log failure to License Log.
return failure to calling software //DRM
Violation Code
end
else
begin
Call System API
Update Grant Status // Number of accesses, time
stamp, and so on
Return result to calling Software
end
end5.6. Integrated system architecture
The proposed SCP technique uses static and dynamic code
injection and encryption to provide autonomous way for pro-
tecting the software code against expected attacks. The origi-
nal software is modiﬁed to provide licensing and copy
protection functionalities. Fig. 12 illustrates the system pro-
posed architecture and the main components:
 Protected Software: A protected and modiﬁed version of the
original software executable ﬁle/ﬁles.
 Protection DLL: The core protection library responsible on
providing different protection services and techniques.
 License File: A secure ﬁle holding different rights and con-
ditions applied to the protected software.
 Activation Server: A web service responsible on providing
the software activation.
 Machine: The end user machine providing the Unique Serial
Number used by Internet Activation technique.
Figure 12 The proposed system architecture.
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ware token and providing the PKCS11 standard interface.
 Token: A hardware component providing cryptographic
and PKI services and a secure store for keys and Grants
data.
Finally, the proposed system architecture can provide dif-
ferent licensing schemes, which can help software distribution
in the software market. The licensing schemes are mainly based
on the license structure, rights and conditions. Table 5 illus-
trates the different license schemes.
5.7. Standalone data protection
There are cases where only Digital Rights Management of dis-
tributed digital contents is required. The distribution of copy-
righted videos, audios, documents, emails, and so on is now a
major business and an enterprise requirement. In this case,
general-purpose software applications, also called rendering
applications or viewers, are used to access those protected
materials.
In the proposed systems, general viewers or specially made
rendering applications are to be protected by the proposed
SCP and can be linked to speciﬁc DRM servers or clouds. In
this case, the same licensing models can be applied on the
copyrighted materials.
For rendering applications developers, it is recommended
to adopt rendering techniques that do not require the entireTable 5 The different licensing schemes that can be achieved by th
License scheme Description
1 Demo/trial license A license that should e
Expiration Period, Tri
2 Rental license Used in Software rent
Duration Limit Tag.
3 Limited license Disabling certain part
(Execute, Read, Copy,
4 Full license Full functioning softw
5 Floating license [46] Software controlled by
the software, using Nu
6 Volume license Software licensed for m
the Public Key Tag codata from the content ﬁle being loaded into memory in a ﬂat
form. This recommendation guarantees that a ﬂat copy of
the encrypted content cannot be dumped from the device mem-
ory. Streaming applications for audio and video do have this
feature by default.
6. Implementation
The proposed system is fully implemented using C/C++ lan-
guage within Softlock protection studio system [45]. Softlock
is a copy protection and Digital Rights Management commer-
cial provider with a local market share of 80%+. The imple-
mented version is designed to support windows 32 and 64
executable ﬁles. The implemented system is tested against
many windows software and provided to software develop-
ment market.
6.1. System components
The ﬁnal system consists of following components:
Protection Studio is a software tool responsible for manag-
ing the protection information, applying the protection to soft-
ware executables, encrypting the data ﬁles, editing and
generating the license ﬁles, preparing token hardware, prepar-
ing the protected optical disk images, and ﬁnally communicat-
ing with the activation server to register the protected
application and to generate the activation serials.
Activation Server is used by machine protection type. It
generates the activation serials and activates the protected
applications. The Activation Server database stores the pro-
tected software information, the generated serials, and the acti-
vated machines information. Using Activation Server software
owners can monitor the serial numbers status, and monitor
and control the machine activation status.
Network Service is used by the protected application to
implement a network license model. Network license model al-
lows multiple clients to use the protected software using single
protection hardware. For example, a single token can be used
to activate the network license and allow many users to use the
software according to the license conditions.
Data Viewers are used to allow standalone data protection.
The viewer extract the appended protection license and per-
forms all security checks before playing or viewing each ﬁle.
Of course, the system is optimized to speed up the securitye system.
xpire after certain criteria, using the following Tags (Number of Trials,
al Period)
al for speciﬁc eﬀective amount of time (usually minutes), using the
s of the software, according to license grants using the Rights Tag
Print . . .)
are without limitations
server license, where users depends on server license in order to run
mber of Users and Number of Sessions Tags
ultiple users, where all users have the same license. Controlled using
mbined with Dongles or single Serial of Activation server
Figure 14 Execution process.
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license are opened.
6.2. License ﬁle
As proposed, the license ﬁle format is derived from XrML
standards. Fig. 13 shows a license ﬁle sample. The ‘‘protec-
tion’’ section provides general protection information. The
‘‘ProtectionKey’’ entry contains an encrypted symmetric key
using both software and hardware certiﬁcates. The ‘‘grants’’
section speciﬁes a list of grants. Each grant speciﬁes the target
module, the permissions and the expiration conditions. The
‘‘issuer’’ section contains the integrity check signature.
6.3. Execution process
The proposed execution process of the protected software is
illustrated in Fig. 14. Initially the protection layer checks for
the presence of debuggers, software monitors and interceptors.
The protection layer then locates, loads, and parses the soft-
ware license. It then checks the integrity and the validity of
the license. The protection layer reads the required type of
hardware authentication then locates and authenticates the
hardware. Hardware authentication is used to check the user
identity using the appropriate section in the license ﬁle. If the
user identity is determined by the Machine-ID, an additional
step is required to register the machine at the Activation Server
and bring the software activation information for this identity.
Other hardware types like token and optical disk should store
and provide the activation; also, they should be protected
against duplication. Using software and hardware identities,
the protection layer decrypts the protection keys available in
the license ﬁle. Know that identities is deﬁned by a PKI certif-
icate and the protection keys are double-encrypted using bothFigure 13 Licensoftware and hardware identities. The protection layer uses
protection keys to decrypt the modiﬁed code section and to
perform the continuous encryption/decryption to IJT entries.
In addition, protection keys are used to decrypt the encrypted
data ﬁles provided with the software.
Next, the protection layer, prepares the software for
launch, it unpack other protected modules and intercept all
system calls in all modules in recursive manner. System calls
interception is important to fulﬁll any access to encrypted datase ﬁle sample.
Figure 15 Protected software with DRM life cycle.
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cense grants. Then, the software execution starts with the pres-
ence of the protection module. The protection module
provides additional security services like resolving IJT entries
using the proposed algorithm, decrypting any access to en-
crypted data, performing periodical security check, and per-
forming additional authentication if the user tries to start an
internal protected module (this is done through a set of APIs
provided within the protection SDK). A periodical security
check is performed to stop runtime attacks and to make sure
that the security hardware is connected. Software internal
modules should be speciﬁed in license ﬁle and the software
developer should inform the protection module whenever the
module is accessed through the call of protection APIs.
6.4. Copy protection and Digital Rights Management lifecycle
This section illustrates a complete lifecycle of a protected piece
of software or content with DRM applied.
As illustrated in Fig. 15, the creator of the digital copy-
righted material uses the protection environment to prepare
the protected contents. This content will be uploaded to a con-
tent server and a set of Meta Data will be sent to the License
Server.
When a user start to consume the digital material, the fol-
lowing messages will be exchanged.
1. A request for the content is sent to the content server.
2. The Content server replies with the copyrighted protected
contents or software. This digital content may be stored
for future use. If the contents are distributed using a CD
or DVD, then these steps are not involved.3. The protected software or content viewer with DRM
enabled will then contact the license server to ask for a
license. The request includes the user identiﬁcation and
the rendering machine ID with other information such as
activation key and payment receipts. The license server pro-
cesses this request contacting other payment and key man-
agement servers to create the license object and decryption
key and sends them back to the user.
4. The rendering software uses the received license to execute
and/or render the contents.
All of these operations can be done online or ofﬂine if other
methods like a token or CD activation is used.
7. Conclusion
In this article, a complete system for applying Copy Protection
and Licensing to software and digital contents is proposed
adding a hardware layer using Dongle or Machine-ID with
Internet Activation and DRM servers. Licensing system is de-
scribed using XrML standard. The license ﬁle is designed to be
signed, secured, and linked to the hardware. The licensing sys-
tem provides a comprehensive Rights and Conditions for con-
trolling DRM and Software distribution. The ﬁnal system
architecture combines the different protection layers to pro-
vide a complete Software Copy Protection system, besides
we proved that such system could provide different licensing
scheme required by the software and digital contents market.
In addition, a new technique is presented to apply the auto-
matic protection for win32 applications. It provides a strong
protection against static and dynamic reverse engineering. It
uses static code encryption, information hiding and data
A comprehensive Software Copy Protection and Digital Rights Management platform 719structure alternations to avoid static reverse engineering. In
addition, it uses dynamic jump table and API interception to
avoid the dynamic reverse engineering. An algorithm is pro-
posed to update IJT entries state in order to enhance the per-
formance of the protected application and to maintain the
security. Finally, the technique proposes a mechanism for the
integration with a Licenses Management System to control
the Digital Rights over the protected application and any en-
crypted data ﬁles.
8. Future work
This article focused on providing the protection service to desk-
top applications in windows environment. Now, many software
vendors provide their software as a web service or application.
Part of the web software is written using either script language
like PHP and Python or interpreted language like C# and Java.
It is recommended to provide new protection techniques for
script-based languages and to support additional interpreted
language like Java. In addition, it is required to enhance the li-
cense model to support the distribution model of the web appli-
cations. Normally this type of software is deployed over the
cloud or using remote virtual or dedicated servers. Authentica-
tion techniques like token, optical disks, and machine activa-
tion is not applicable. Finally, it is required to support
desktop applications for other operating systems and computer
platforms. Operating systems like Windows Mobile, Android
and IOS are very popular for their use in mobile systems.
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